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This paper presents a qualitative study, consisting of six focus groups
organized according to the age of participants, on public attitudes
surrounding the right to privacy. Several major findings emerged from
these focus groups, including qualitative evidence that suggests that age
does not play a major role in respondents’ attitudes toward privacy. Based
upon these findings and other patterns in respondents’ attitudes, we
advance a theory that relates people’s opinions on the value of privacy
within society writ large to their perceptions of an individual’s ability to
protect his or her personal information. Finally, we conclude by
speculating about a new conception of privacy—one that may comport
with a world where the pace of technological innovation is extraordinary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We call this project the “Frog Project” and we call ourselves the
“Frog Team.” Although we each have had longstanding interests in
various privacy policies, the catalyst for bringing us together was
revisiting a column in The New York Times, which quoted Laurence
Tribe, referencing an old parable about a frog relishing the warmth of
his bath, only to find it gradually getting unbearably hot. As Tribe stated
in the context of privacy:
The more people grow accustomed to a listening environment
in which the ear of Big Brother is assumed to be behind every
wall, behind every e-mail, and invisibly present in every
electronic communication, telephonic or otherwise—that is
the kind of society, as people grow accustomed to it, in which
you can end up being boiled to death without ever noticing
that the water is getting hotter, degree by degree.1
Tribe’s reflections, and our own experiences, initially led us to an
informal weekly discussion session on privacy-implicated matters. We
began by revisiting materials familiar to all students of civil
liberties—the famous Supreme Court discovery of a “right to privacy”2
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,3 the revisiting of the origins of this
right in Roe v. Wade,4 and the expansion of the Court’s interest from
1 Bob Herbert, What’s Left Unsaid, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/23/opinion/whats-left-unsaid.html.
2 See generally Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 715
(2010) (discussing the use of the right to privacy as the legal basis for court cases
moving forward); see also Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 483 (2017) (discussing broadly the right to privacy in a contemporary context).
3 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
4 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
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personal autonomy matters to more of the surveillance issues of the
twenty-first century.5 But what became clear to all of us very quickly
was how limited these doctrinal considerations were, and how they
dramatically lagged exploring privacy matters in domains that affect
most of us the majority of the time.
The gap between our “old reliable” court cases and our daily
experiences gave birth to this project. We were interested in “things
privacy,” and were determined to discern the public opinion about the
water seemingly getting hotter—maybe even getting to the boiling
point!
We were resolved to explore this issue without
prejudgment—without wringing our hands about a public cringing in
the rapid advent of a dystopian world. There were many ways to
proceed, but we opted for exploratory, open-ended, qualitative data
collection rather than for a more rigorous (and confining) quantitative
approach. More details about our approach can be found in the research
design section below.6 Here we note our overarching research
interest—to understand responses to the often-mind-boggling pace of
technological innovations and the implications of these innovations for
one’s privacy. Although our goals included gingerly testing some
hypotheses, for the most part, our interests were descriptive: learning
how the public felt about a range of privacy issues, and from these views
teasing out more themes that capture, in nuanced ways, public
attitudes—or lack thereof—on the bathwater very quickly heating up.
II. BACKGROUND
A comprehensive review of the vast compilation of existing privacy
literature was beyond the scope of our research. Instead, we began by
focusing on Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s law review article, The
Right to Privacy,7 which fellow scholars have endlessly referenced.
Warren and Brandeis contended that a right to privacy existed within
American society and that this right was derived from earlier contract
and property common law precedents.8 They argued that a right to
privacy should be understood as a qualified right, simply meaning “the

5 See generally Milton Heumann et al., Privacy and Surveillance: Public Attitudes on
Cameras on the Street, in the Home, and in the Workplace, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37,
60–74 (2016) (examining the legal issues implicated in the increased use of
surveillance).
6 See infra Part III.
7 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
8 Id. at 208.
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right to be let alone.”9 This explicit legal right was deemed
fundamentally necessary in response to a multitude of factors:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the
world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has
become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions
upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress,
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.10
The notion that privacy was a fundamental necessity is one of the
central themes of another important piece of the literature on privacy.
Alan Westin’s work, Privacy and Freedom, approached the issue of
defining privacy and explaining its function within differing societies
from a sociological perspective.11 Westin stated that privacy was more
than a personal preference, but instead, “an important functional
requirement for the effective operation of a social structure.”12 Warren
and Brandeis presented their conception of a right to privacy within the
legal understanding that this protection was qualified, not absolute.13
Similarly, Westin argued that each society struggles with finding “an
overall equilibrium” between demands for privacy balanced with other
societal demands.14 This struggle was conceptualized based on a crucial
idea: “[A]ll individuals are constantly engaged in an attempt to find
sufficient privacy to serve their general social roles as well as their
individual needs of the moment. Either too much or too little privacy
can create imbalances which seriously jeopardize the individual’s
well-being.”15
In addition to this sociological conceptualization of privacy, Westin
speculated that this endless struggle for achieving a balance between
privacy and other societal interests could be seriously complicated by
future technological developments.16 The first possible threat was that
technological and legal developments would enable the expansion of
sophisticated surveillance capabilities, which would threaten individual
9 Id. at 193; see also THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (1879) (Warren and Brandeis adopted the
phrase from this treatise by Judge Thomas Cooley).
10 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 196.
11 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 2 (Daniel J. Solove, ed., 2d ed. 2015).
12 Id. at 64 (quoting ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 375 (1957)).
13 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 214–18.
14 WESTIN, supra note 11, at 27.
15 Id. at 44.
16 Id. at 91–95.
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and collective privacy.17
The second was that technological
developments could increasingly allow outsiders to access information
that an individual desired to remain confidential.18 Lastly, the already
occurring practice of collecting data related to individuals’ activities
could be vastly expanded to allow government and private
organizations to compile a large collection of data that could effectively
lead to a dossier on every individual.19 Westin’s three predictions
proved to be incredibly accurate.
Case law on privacy matters is of comparatively more recent
vintage. Initially, the Court gave its attention to matters of personal
autonomy—birth control,20 abortion,21 and then same-sex marriage.22
Then, more recently and more significantly for this paper, the Court
began examining technological issues. In Riley v. California, law
enforcement searched the car of appellant David Leon Riley after
discovering his possession of an invalid driver’s license.23 The search of
his car was lawful, and led to his arrest for possession of firearms—but
this was not the search Riley was appealing.24 Upon searching his car,
police confiscated his phone and searched that, as well.25 The contents
on his phone provided police with evidence of his gang affiliation,
leading to separate charges, including shooting at an occupied vehicle,
attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm.26 Riley
appealed on his Fourth Amendment rights, arguing that the evidence
found in his phone should not be admitted at trial.27 The Court ruled in
his favor, holding that the warrantless search exception (aimed at
protecting law enforcement) did not apply, as digital data cannot
possibly harm the officers, and the evidence could have easily been
preserved until the officers obtained a search warrant.28 The Court
classified cell phones as “minicomputers”29 that contain extensive

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 97–143.
Id. at 145–49.
Id. at 173–84.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 652 (2015).
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014).
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 398–99.
Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
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private information and held that any information stored via “cloud
computing” is not even technically on the arrestee’s person.30
Chief Justice Roberts, in his opinion for the Court, addressed this
concern by stating, “The fact that technology now allows an individual
to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any
less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”31
Obtaining a warrant is necessary to search a phone, as it is a separate
piece of evidence and phones are “such a pervasive and insistent part of
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were
an important feature of human anatomy.”32 That the Chief Justice would
liken cell phones to a person’s anatomy is a testament to the intimacy of
the data stored on these devices.
In 2018, in Carpenter v. United States, the Court further
distinguished between cell phones and other potential sources of
evidence.33 Rather than examining the protections for information
found on a cell phone, as was done in Riley, Carpenter explored the
protections for information about a cell phone, including the location
and movements of the cell phone (and potentially its user).34 Called “cell
site” location information (CSLI), this data provided the evidence
needed to charge appellant Timothy Carpenter with aiding and abetting
armed robbery involving interstate commerce, making it a federal
offense.35 Carpenter appealed, claiming that the warrantless search and
seizure of this data was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and
the Court agreed.36 In a separate decision, the Court held that Fourth
Amendment protections not only include property interests but extend
to reasonable expectations of privacy.37 With respect to privacy rights,
the Court declined to extend the “third-party doctrine”—which argues
that any information disclosed to a third party carries no reasonable
expectation of privacy—to CSLI, as this type of location data is more
intrusive than the third-party doctrine could reasonably encompass.38
Thus, the Court required a separate warrant for the access of location
data, further bolstering privacy rights in an evolving digital age.39

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 397–98.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 384.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
Id. at 2214.
Id. at 2212–13.
Id. at 2220.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222.
Id.
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Despite the increasing number of privacy-related cases appearing
before the Supreme Court, scholars have continued to wrestle with
conceptualizing the function of privacy within American society. Judge
Richard Posner noted that privacy is simply misunderstood and is
fundamentally about concealment.40
Posner observed that
“[individuals] want to manipulate the world around them by selective
disclosure of facts about themselves,” and that this conception of
privacy can be considered harmful rather than beneficial for society as
a whole.41 Frequently critiqued by Solove and other fellow scholars, this
portrayal of privacy is more controversial than not. In his work, Nothing
to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy and Security, Solove argues
that the lack of a definitive conception of privacy has resulted in
separate privacy protections being continually balanced against other
societal demands.42 Contemporary societal issues, particularly issues of
national security, have resulted in individuals’ forfeiture of privacy
protections for a wide range of benefits.43
The idea that individuals have continued to trade privacy for other
perceived benefits has also been addressed in the most recent notable
work regarding privacy: Shoshana Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance
Capitalism. Individual information has become the fuel driving this new
form of “surveillance capitalism,” which Zuboff defined as “parasitic and
self-referential. It revives Karl Marx’s old image of capitalism as a
vampire that feeds on labor, but with an unexpected turn. Instead of
labor, surveillance capitalism feeds on every aspect of human’s
experience.”44 Furthermore, Zuboff explains how the commodification
of individual behavior has created the most valued good within this new
form of capitalism at the direct expense of privacy protections within
society.45
Finally, of importance for our work, we examined two major
quantitative studies that presented a glimpse into American attitudes
about the issue of privacy. The first study was published in 1981 by Alan
Westin in the wake of the passage of the 1974 Federal Privacy
Protection Act and the establishment of the Privacy Protection Study

40

Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978).
Id. at 400.
42 DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY
24–26 (2011).
43 Id. at 55–57.
44 SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE
AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 7–8 (2019).
45 See id. at 99–102.
41
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Commission.46 Westin’s study was designed to evaluate if this
unprecedented federal legislation, which included the establishment of
the Privacy Protection Study Commission, addressed privacy concerns
highlighted in earlier published research.47 Additionally, Westin sought
to specifically identify “what degree privacy can and should be
protected in an intensely service-oriented, technologically-based
society—a society whose collective ‘marketplace’ is fundamentally
fueled by the collection, storage, and use of the personal information of
its citizens.”48 The second major quantitative study we examined was
the 2019 Pew Privacy Study, which was designed to gauge American
attitudes toward specific contemporary privacy issues and potential
threats facing them.49 Despite being separated by thirty-eight years,
data from both studies presented a significant number of interesting
correlations that should be further explored in a separate research
project examining American attitudes toward privacy over time.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
In our research, we aimed to collect rich qualitative data well
beyond the constrained responses available within a survey
questionnaire. Our study asks individuals to elaborate not only on their
attitudes toward privacy but on why they believe they and their
associates have developed such attitudes. We conducted six focus
groups to collect the privacy data. A priori, we hypothesized that the
age of the respondents might often be an explanatory variable, and thus
we structured the design to test that theory. Specifically, we conducted
six focus groups, two groups for each of three age ranges.50 Each focus
group was two hours long, and the median number of participants in
each was seven. For most of the focus groups, all five of the authors
participated,51 and we each led the discussion on different sections of

46

Fair Fin. Info. Practices Act: Hearing on S. 1928 Before the H. Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. 480–82
(1980).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 576 (remarks of Dr. Alan F. Westin).
49 See Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling
Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacyconcerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information.
50 We used the following three age group classifications: “Young Adults,” aged
approximately 18–30, “Middle Age,” aged approximately 31–65, and “Seniors,” aged 65
and older.
51 On occasion, one of the authors had to be absent (illness, work conflicts, etc.) from
a focus group. Generally, though, all or most were present for every group session.
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the interview schedule. A copy of our questions can be found in
Appendix A.52
Our subject matter ranged over a large number of privacy matters,
and we tried to balance adhering to the interview schedule with
allowing discussions to flourish, even when they deviated somewhat
from the questions at hand. Indeed, the inter-participant exchanges
yielded some of our most intriguing results. After each of the focus
groups, the authors individually wrote up the sessions, reporting on
what the discussants said and reflecting on their comments.
Synthesizing these focus group reports, comparing responses across the
six groups, and discussing our conclusions as a research team yielded
the data that we now review.
IV. FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS
A. Age Rejected: The Dog That Didn’t Bark!
We begin by acknowledging the rejection of the hypothesis about
which we were most confident in its explanatory power. Specifically, it
seemed to us that the age of the respondents would matter in a rather
systematic way as we explored the implications of the “right to privacy”
and technological developments. Our initial intragroup discussions led
us to hypothesize that younger respondents were less agonized about
privacy tradeoffs and were more accepting of a wide range of
technological developments that, potentially, could lead to lessened
privacy. To our surprise, this hypothesis was not confirmed. As each of
us studied our focus group findings, we marveled at just how wrong we
were. The themes discussed below did not characterize a specific age
group but instead crosscut these groups. Delving into why the “dog
didn’t bark” and why age was not a good explanatory variable
(intriguing to speculate about) allows us a first peek into the general
attitudes of the respondents—across all ages!
For instance, “consent” was one topic that we hypothesized would
be particularly split by age.53 U.S. federal law permits the recording of
individual-to-individual conversations by one party without the
knowledge or consent of the other party or parties involved, as long as

52

See infra Appendix A.
In our preliminary research discussions, there seemed to be a clear divide
between older individuals, who favored two-party consent laws, and younger
individuals, who were generally amicable to one-party. This anecdotal trend was not
replicated in the focus groups.
53
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at least one person is aware of the recording.54 Thirty-eight states and
the District of Columbia also have what are called “one-party consent
laws.”55 Even in two-party states, certain exceptional circumstances
allow only one party to be privy to the knowledge of a recording taking
place. Some exceptions may include recordings made by police or law
enforcement officials, emergency or first responders, or communication
service providers, as well as recordings made pursuant to a court
order.56 Individual states have their own exceptions.57
We found that the majority of respondents, regardless of age,
preferred a two-party system. While many acknowledged exceptional
circumstances, such as in cases of domestic abuse or in situations with
uneven power dynamics (e.g., employee-employer), the consensus was
that two-party systems enabled transparency and trust, rather than the
instilled sense of paranoia that they did not want to become the norm.
Those exceptions, they argued, should not become the rule. The idea of
“everyone going around recording each other,” as one respondent said,
“would set up a dangerous precedent.”58 Many others agreed that a
slippery slope toward a “surveillance society” was an inherent threat to
overall privacy, with one person making a principled argument that
“privacy is [my] right, why should I have to give it up?”59 In opposition,
the minority that chose the one-party system claimed that if they had
nothing to hide, they did not care who recorded them and why—saying
that safety or protection was worth sacrificing privacy. Some
54 Recording
Phone Calls and Conversations, DIG. MEDIA L. PROJECT,
https://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/recording-phone-calls-and-conversations (last
visited April 13, 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)).
55 Id. Two-party states also differ as to whether both parties must consent explicitly
(i.e., “Yes, I consent to being recorded.”), or whether conversing after notification of
recording has been provided is sufficient for implicit consent. The eleven other states
(California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington) have “two-party consent laws” (or “allparty”) in effect. State Law: Recording, DIG. MEDIA L. PROJECT, https://www.dmlp.org/
legal-guide/state-law-recording (last visited April 19, 2021).
56 For a lengthier exploration of recording consent laws, see Rauvin Johl, Reassessing
Wiretap and Eavesdropping Statutes: Making One-Party Consent the Default, 12 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 177, 178–80 (2018).
57 Id. For example, Illinois and Oregon are two-party states except in cases of
electronic recording. Another example is Hawaii, which only requires all-party consent
in cases where the recording device is installed in a private place. Massachusetts, for
instance, is the only state without a “public location” exception, meaning that a
conversation occurring in a public place still requires two party consent. States also
vary as to how consent is executed, and whether such recordings are admissible in court.
58 Member of Focus Group 3 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on
file with author).
59 Member of Focus Group 4 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 20, 2019) (on file
with author).
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respondents went as far as saying the so-called surveillance society
already exists; privacy in the modern day is so far eroded that, as one
respondent claimed, “everything is being recorded anyway.”60 Despite
preconceived notions concerning general familiarity with technology,
attitudes toward recording consent laws, and privacy more broadly,
participant’s ages could not explain this dynamic.
B. Protecting Privacy and Terms of Service Agreements: Reality or
Illusion?
We can further deduce the extent to which society has prioritized
other interests over privacy, such as leniency with business, through
close examination of Terms of Service (TOS) agreements. Upon review
of focus group attitudes about this issue, three facets of the agreements
emerge as potentially problematic: (1) the actual policies that permit
companies to collect vast quantities of personal data; (2) the mechanism
employed to obtain consent from users; and (3) the societal costs
incurred from not accepting these agreements, which in turn apply
pressure on users to consent irrespective of the agreement’s provisions.
The first facet was only problematic for a minority of our
respondents—those that viewed the mere act of data collection itself as
invasive. This, however, is the most lucrative aspect of several
companies’ business models, and the most necessary for others. Google
turns a profit by using data collected from consumers to sell targeted
advertising but also needs this data to power improvements to the
Google search engine and Google maps.61 Amazon and Apple take voice
recordings from Alexa62 and Siri,63 respectively, to improve the accuracy
of their voice recognition software. Almost all companies use cookies
when accessing their websites, which track consumer data as they move
from webpage to webpage.64 When viewed individually, this data seems
small and innocuous. The issue is when these data are aggregated into
a larger profile that tells companies more than what consumers

60 Focus Group 2 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on file with
author).
61 Nicole Lindsey, Google Data Collection Is More Extensive and Intrusive Than You
Ever Imagined, CPO MAGAZINE (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.cpomagazine.com/dataprivacy/google-data-collection-is-more-extensive-and-intrusive-than-you-everimagined.
62 Alexa Terms of Use, Section 4.1, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=201809740 (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
63 Ask Siri, Dictation, & Privacy, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210657,
(last updated Feb. 19, 2021).
64 What are Cookies?, INDIANA UNIV., https://kb.iu.edu/d/agwm (last updated Jan. 18,
2018).
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expected it would reveal. For instance, while individual facts about a
person may confer little information when considered on their own,
taken together, these facts may paint a more complete picture of that
person than what the consumer intended to divulge.65 One report
demonstrated that merely going through normal life routines with an
Android phone led Google to be able to collect enough user data to
identify user interests accurately.66 One participant was deeply
troubled by this when he said, “I mean they know so much about you.
They pretty much own you. I downloaded all of the data that Google had
on me. I had so much data. I made the mistake of buying a Google
Pixel.”67 This is often the case—a person may believe they have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, only to discover that their data had
been collected consistently, and without their knowledge, over an
extended period.
TOS Agreements are formatted as either “opt in” or “opt out.”68
When a website prompts its users to agree, usually at the bottom of a
page immediately upon opening the site, this specific site is using the
opt-in style. If no such prompt appears, users must opt out of using the
program entirely.69 This may even be less clear in cases when the user
interface is amorphous. While nearly all respondents understood that
they had opted in to Google’s TOS when they used the search engine,
significantly fewer respondents were aware of Alexa’s voice recordings
being sent back to Amazon for analysis.70
We hypothesized that many respondents would not be aware that,
by using Google’s service, they were agreeing to the corporation’s data
collection policies. Most respondents did appreciate, however, that by
availing themselves of this service (and others), they had acquiesced to
the corporation’s conditions on the ease with which the organization
could aggregate data, sell data, and disseminate data.71 They were
65

See Lindsey, supra note 61.
Douglas C. Schmidt, Google Data Collection, DIGITAL CONTENT NEXT (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://digitalcontentnext.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/DCN-Google-DataCollection-Paper.pdf.
67 Focus Group 3 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on file with
author).
68 See Berkson v. GoGo, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing the
legality of various methods of obtaining consent).
69 Id. at 376.
70 See Matt Day et al., Amazon Workers Are Listening to What You Tell Alexa,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0410/is-anyone-listening-to-you-on-alexa-a-global-team-reviews-audio.
71 See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1880, 1881 (2013) (discussing what individuals lay observers understand in
terms of data consent laws).
66
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aware that they had “opted in” without being given an option to “opt
out.” Most respondents were resigned to the fact that this is how TOS
agreements functioned in practice.
Taking it one step further, we asked about situations in which the
organization did ask for explicit authorization to its terms and
conditions, meaning a person had to affirmatively “opt in” rather than
being automatically assumed to agree to terms and conditions by using
the service. The assumption was that by being given explicit statements
about what they were agreeing to, respondents would have more choice
and would have a better handle on what would be done with their
information, effectively providing more control over the dissemination
of the information they provided. A priori, this sounded more than
plausible, and indeed suggested a policy for addressing privacy issues
moving forward (we will turn to these in the last section of this paper).72
But once again, what we assumed was obvious—that a choice to “opt in”
with specific explanations as to what was being agreed upon would
enhance an individual’s control over private information—was
incorrect.
Of our respondents across all six focus groups, almost no
respondents claimed to read any parts of the TOS.73 Signing these was
routine; ignoring their language was universal. Some bemoaned the
length of these agreement sheets; some the difficulty of reading them.74
Even when we probed deeper and suggested altering the terms of the
agreement in ways consistent with policies being adopted in Europe and
some states,75 we found at best a grudging response from a few of the
respondents that maybe one change or another (i.e., highlighting key
points, shorter forms) might make them give more than a mere cursory
look to the documents. A few of these comments are illustrative of these
themes:

72

See infra Section VI.B.
See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546 (2014) (discussing issues surrounding the lack of reading
within the context of consumer contract law).
74 One Focus Group Participant (from our sixth group, Middle Aged individuals),
specifically noted that the determining factor behind his reasoning for not reading TOS
agreements was the perceived complexity of these document’s language. This
participant suggested using lower Lexile levels as a standard for encouraging broader
understanding of these documents.
75 See infra Section VI.B.
73
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I skim through the TOS agreements, but that is ultimately not
going to make much of a difference. If you don’t sign it, you
don’t get to use the service. And if it is an electronic copy there
even isn’t an opportunity to modify it[.]76
There are sometimes 60 pages of TOS . . . you can’t read them
. . . few know what they say. You assume they are collecting
data . . . if there was more of a choice to opt in, just in theory a
difference, since if you don’t opt in, you can’t use the
service. . . . The European Union efforts to change TOS [i.e.,
highlighting, underlining, shortening] won’t matter—no one
reads them.77
Somewhat facetiously, another respondent claimed that “all the
terms and services really need to say is ‘We’re taking all your stuff, we’re
making money off it, good luck.’”78 His point, of course, was that clients
really have a sense of what they are giving away but will not change their
behavior in any case.
This turns general contract theory on its head, as contracts are
generally predicated on the idea of consent being given actively as an
opt in. In a 1994 Yale Law Journal article, Peter Schuck wrote, “[t]o say
that one cannot be bound by a promise that one did not voluntarily and
knowingly make is to say that the individual should be the author of her
own undertakings, that a genuine respect for her dignity requires a
broad deference to her choices.”79 The issue today is that many people
cannot opt out of terms such as Google’s or Apple’s without incurring
opportunity and productivity costs. Putting together the various
services and websites respondents visited that had TOS, almost no one
felt that they could live today without being bound by these contracts.80
When asked why they continued to use Google despite expressing
dismay with the way Google collected their data, they replied, “Because
it’s convenient, and I will be left behind socially.”81 It does not matter if

76

Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author).
Focus Group 3 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on file with
author).
78 Focus Group 6 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with
author).
79 Peter H. Shuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994).
80 Focus Groups 1–6, Rutgers University (Sept. 13–Oct. 6, 2019).
81 Focus Group 2 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019 (on file with
author).
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consent is questionably obtained if people do not have alternatives that
allow them to “voluntarily and knowingly make” other choices.82
C. The Role of Government and Corporate Giants: Trust and
Tradeoffs
To contextualize privacy and, more importantly, how people
conceive privacy, we deemed it necessary to decipher the difference
between the expectations people have of public versus private entities.
Since many people hold double standards, we found that it was
beneficial to partake in a simple voting process, revealing the results to
the group after the voting was completed. Then, we allowed people to
attempt to defend their clear contradictions in their conceptions.

82 See Joseph V. Demarco & Brian A. Fox, Data Rights and Data Wrongs: Civil
Litigation and the New Privacy Norms, 128 YALE L.J. F. 1016, 1024–26 (2019) (discussing
lawsuits involving private parties and data storage).
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Question 1: Who do you trust more with your private information?
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Question 2: In general, who do you trust more with the following sets of
data: private companies or the government?
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Consistent with our other findings,83 responses were coherent
across age groups. We found that, overall, public entities received more
support, or “trust,” from our focus groups. We tested this by first
varying the entities (i.e., the Treasury or credit card companies), but
asking about a general sense of trust, and then by varying the
information obtained (i.e., your location), but asking generally “public
or private.” We found that when naming specific entities, an
overwhelming majority selected the public option over the private
option.
When asking about specific information, though, “the
government” either won by a very slim majority or even lost the vote. A
factor that could be influencing this contradiction is the negative stigma
attributed to “the government.” People have always been distrusting of
this ominous entity, and that is a likely reason for the voting
discrepancy. When we asked about specific government agencies,
though, people realized that these agencies do not warrant a sense of
fear or distrust, voting in their favor. Another factor that likely
influenced our participants in their voting habits is the overwhelming
news coverage relating to breaches of data by private corporations.
Focus group participants reported that stories about privacy issues with
Facebook, Google, and Amazon influenced their decision to pick the
government agency rather than the specific company. This could also
explain why—in an opposite pattern to that of the government—private
companies generally performed better in the collective than as
individual companies.
The one noticeable outlier from the aforementioned trends was in
the “Associations” question in the second round, where a majority of
respondents said that they trusted private companies to know this
information more than the government. During the focus groups,
respondents would sometimes respond that they picked private
companies when they could rationalize the private company knowing
this information.84 Given the prevalence of social media networks as a
primary online interface across all generations, it is conceivable that the
public has largely accepted private companies having detailed
information on a person’s friend and family network.
This model of analysis was designed to gauge the “trust,” an
often-immeasurable feeling, that participants had in various agencies,
groups, etc. By seeking a justification as to why the entity would need
the information we were asking about, participants unveiled their
reasoning skills, ultimately seeming to draw objective conclusions. If
83

See supra Section IV.A.
Focus group notes, Rutgers University (Sept. 13–Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with
author).
84
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they were able to see a reason for an entity to know that information,
the decision was made clearer.85 One participant, though, articulated
the true design of our questioning, stating, “[a] lot of this comes down to
trust. How much do you trust the government not to abuse security
cameras, how much do you trust Apple to do what they say they will
do.”86 Reinforcing other theories of ours as well, this participant
categorized the entire government as one entity, while distinguishing
Apple from other tech giants. This participant did not pick a side in this
statement but instead discussed the idea of trading off some privacy for
increased security. The government, as he referred to it, is often thought
of as an entity that strips the general population of privacy with a
sweeping promise of safety.87 Apple, though, promises security at its
forefront.88 The participant draws a similarity with these two,
proposing that they both need to prove their efficacy and their reliability
in order to gain the trust of the American people.
V. THE RESIGNATION CURVE: PROFILES IN PRIVACY
Across the landscape of themes that surfaced during our focus
groups, certain patterns emerged that may offer some broader
explanatory power in deciphering people’s overall attitudes toward
privacy. As mentioned, we initially hypothesized that a person’s age
might be influential in organizing individuals’ opinions on privacy
relative to one another. Despite the rejection of our age hypothesis,
attitudes about privacy were not homogenous. They could still be
roughly organized into a loose typology according to their perceived
ability to control their personal privacy, and according to their
overarching opinions on the current (and future) state of privacy
throughout society.

85 See Auxier et al., supra note 49. Our methodology for gauging the trust of focus
group participants was similar to the Pew Privacy Survey’s construction of survey
questions for gauging the feelings of respondents as related to the sharing of
information with government and private organizations. See id. Participants in the Pew
Privacy Study responded overwhelmingly that they did not feel the benefits of sharing
their personal information with the government or private companies outweighed the
possible risks. In more in-depth questions, however, there was significant variation in
the participants’ responses when asked about their feelings toward sharing specific
types of personal information with the government and private companies. See id.
Additionally, there were also significant differences in the participants’ responses when
asked about their feelings toward sharing personal information with specific types of
government and private organizations. See id.
86 Focus Group 4 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 20, 2019) (on file with author).
87 Id.
88 Apple Privacy Policy, APPLE (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.apple.com/legal/
privacy/en-ww.
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Throughout our various topics of discussion, one feeling guided
nearly every respondent’s attitude—resignation. Specifically, almost all
focus group respondents agreed that the value society places on privacy
today is historically lower than at any other point in history.89 Nearly
all focus group respondents also believed—for better or worse—that
little could be done to change society’s values as they pertain to privacy,
due in large part to the various competing interests (convenience,
security, etc.) for which privacy is often exchanged.
What did vary among respondents, however, was the extent to
which they perceived their ability to maintain agency over their
personal privacy. In other words, despite the belief that new technology
has pushed society away from privacy writ large, certain respondents
expressed the idea that technology could also be proactively used—if
individuals chose to do so—as a safeguard in protecting privacy through
such practices as private browsing, virtual private networks (VPNs),
and encryption.90 Moreover, individuals’ general attitudes toward
society given the current state of privacy also varied, as even certain
respondents resigned to a world devoid of privacy believed that this was
not necessarily problematic. Rather than being consumed with worry
over the future of privacy, these individuals instead choose to enjoy the
comfort of warm water, so to speak.
In reviewing the different attitudes among focus group
respondents, each respondent could be arranged relative to one another
based on both their perceived ability to influence their personal privacy
and their general attitude toward society given the current state of
privacy. We call this arrangement the “Resignation Curve,” as
respondents who possessed extremely negative attitudes or who
possessed extremely positive attitudes toward society—given the
current state of privacy—both generally believed there was little that
could be done to safeguard personal privacy. A smaller group of
respondents, who represent the center of the Resignation Curve,
expressed neither extremely positive nor extremely negative views
toward the state of privacy but believed there were pragmatic measures
that individuals could take to safeguard their personal privacy if they
chose to do so over a competing interest.

89

See Auxier et al., supra note 49. Similar to this finding from our focus groups, data
from the Pew Research Center’s 2019 Privacy Study showed that 70 percent of
participants responded that their personal information is less secure than compared to
five years ago. Id.
90 Focus group notes, Rutgers University (Sept. 13–Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with
author).
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Respondents could therefore be loosely placed into one of three
groups along the Resignation Curve: the Defeatists, the Pragmatists, and
the Futurists. Respondents do not fit neatly into only one of these
groups. Instead, the groups are meant to represent sections of a
spectrum. Where respondents fell on this spectrum indicates a rough
approximation of their attitudes toward privacy. It is important to note
that the curve depicted below does not depict the frequency with which
focus group respondents could be labeled as members of each of these
groups. Instead, the Resignation Curve is meant to represent a
relationship between two categories of attitudes (represented by its
axes), and whose extremes mark the most typical attitudes of certain
typologies as outlined below.

A. The Defeatists: Privacy Is an Illusion!
The Defeatists’ attitudes were defined by complete and total
resignation—not just to an individual’s inability to maintain agency
over his or her privacy but also to the guaranteed negative
consequences of a society that does not value privacy. Individuals on
the left side of the Resignation Curve, where most focus group
participants could be placed, were specifically resigned to the belief that
society was now structured such that avoiding incentives to trade
privacy in exchange for a variety of competing interests (security,
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convenience, financial gain, etc.)91 would impose a burden on
individuals far outside what is now considered normal given the
advancement of technology.
Consider visual surveillance, for example.92 On a very basic level, it
is hard to argue against the security that cameras afford over streets,
university parking lots, and so many other public—and sometimes
private—locales. Though one can argue about their deterrent value, few
argue that the information they provide is not important to identifying
culprits and so on.93 Similarly, there is an addictive attractiveness to the
use of Google’s search engine. The ease, accessibility, and convenience
are a brew almost impossible to resist ingesting. Related are the
unbelievable efficiency rewards of technology: speed of locating
accounts, storage of information, and myriad other benefits that accrue
from electronic collection and storage of data.94 Although privacy
implications of different social policies have been present throughout
our history,95 the scope of the changes of the past fifty years far exceeds
anything experienced in our past. The impossible has become not just
possible, but a reality, and in some instances, commonplace.
Many Defeatists largely view this “new normal” as an existential
threat to democracy and to the United States’ ability to maintain a free
and open society in which individuals retain their autonomy without the
auspices of Big Brother or Big Technology watching over them.96 Some
Defeatists expressed fears that, without privacy, the country was now
more vulnerable to authoritarianism, given the notion that people now
fundamentally lack choice in deciding what, where, and to whom to
divulge information. Any “choice” concerning whether or not to use a
service or product (i.e., smartphones, search engines, mapping

91 See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 1369, 1371–78 (2017) (discussing privacy as a commodity).
92 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936–45
(2013) (providing a broader discussion of surveillance).
93 See generally Milton Heumann et al., Privacy and Surveillance: Public Attitudes on
Cameras on the Street, in the Home, and in the Workplace, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37,
60–74 (2016).
94 See Mike Shaw, Why Google is the Best Search Engine (and Why Businesses Should
Care), TOWER MARKETING (June 15, 2020), https://www.towermarketing.net/blog/
google-best-search-engine.
95 See generally LAWRENCE CAPPELLO, NONE OF YOUR DAMN BUSINESS 6 (2019) (exploring
the history of conflicts surrounding technological advancements that arguably
conflicted with privacy values).
96 See generally Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and
Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2016) (exploring the public’s interest in
privacy topics around the time of Edward Snowden’s disclosure of National Security
Agency surveillance in 2013).

HEUMANN (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

5/14/2021 12:26 PM

PRIVACY IN THE PUBLIC EYE

1445

applications), as one Defeatist noted, is simply an “illusion,”97 because
the cost imposed by declining to use such services places a burden on
the individual outside what is now commonly deemed acceptable.
While entities may not necessarily force individuals to disclose private
information, the normalization of using certain technology has
nevertheless forced individuals to trade their privacy.
The following is a quote from an individual near the Defeatist end
of the Resignation Curve: “[N]othing I can do [about Google keeping
search history] . . . . It is what it is. The individual is powerless. I’m just
one person.”98 Another Defeatist summarized their feelings by asserting
the following: “Privacy is an illusion. I am not sure there is a definition
of privacy anymore. It is too late to make material changes in our
behavior when it comes to using services like Google. We are already
hooked.”99 Other Defeatists similarly reported, “I have no privacy and I
can’t expect it to get any better soon,”100 and, “If you don’t sign [the TOS
agreement], you don’t get to use the service.”101 Finally, on surveillance
generally, yet another respondent stated, “There is surveillance all the
time, all privacy is gone, but nothing to be done. Barring a catastrophe,
there is no privacy, it’s almost like a Pandora’s box . . . . Get used to the
new world. What can I do as an individual?”102
B. The Futurists: Embrace the New World!
Focus group respondents at both ends of the Resignation Curve
shared a key characteristic: when it comes to new norms of information
sharing, both Defeatists and Futurists believed that resistance is futile.
Both groups are generally accepting of the “this is the way it is”
mentality regarding privacy, given the advancement of technology in the
21st century. The defining difference between Defeatists and Futurists,
however, is that the latter tend to believe that this new society is
trending in a positive direction rather than a negative one. Futurists,
unlike Defeatists, generally embrace the technology that Defeatists
believe to be responsible for the decline of privacy. Of the three groups
herein defined, Futurists represent the smallest number of focus group
participants. They tend to not only accept the idea that society now
97

Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author).
Focus Group 3 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on file with
author).
99 Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author).
100 Focus Group 6 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with
author).
101 Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author).
102 Focus Group 5 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 23, 2019) (on file with
author).
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values privacy less than ever before but also actively believe that the
costs of trading away one’s privacy are outweighed by the incentives
and benefits received from doing so.
These individuals trumpeted technology’s benefits, and generally
believed privacy concerns were overblown, exaggerated, and more
often than not theoretical musings of those far removed from reality.
Futurists typically based their beliefs on the presumption that new
technology brings about immense benefits for the “greater good” of
society, such as heightened security, enhanced abilities to find and
prosecute criminals, increased health benefits, and greater convenience
in people’s daily lives. Many Futurists also acknowledged that this
advancement is achieved not despite the diminution of privacy but
because of it. Individuals along the right side of the Resignation Curve
sometimes even went as far as to champion the possibilities of mass data
collection, especially in fields such as human genetics.103 That these
respondents would not only move past a general acceptance of a society
dominated by information sharing but also seek to thrive in it is a
testament to the wide array of opinions expressed—even by small
subsections of the population—on the topic of privacy.
The more moderate of these respondents (those more toward the
center-right of the Resignation Curve) felt that they had “nothing to
hide,” so privacy intrusions were not much of an intrusion at all. More
forceful proponents said that the handwringing, dystopia-invoking
voices of privacy champions were nothing more than “Chicken
Littles,”104 exaggerating the costs of technology and not crediting the
enormous benefits that are associated with change. Not infrequently,
these respondents threw down a challenge to the focus group: name a
privacy concern that has actually materialized and affected individuals
seriously and negatively. These challenges often went unanswered by
other focus group respondents.105
The following are quotes from individuals near the Futurist end of
the Resignation Curve:
Has anyone ever suffered from these privacy concerns we are
bandying about? I never did. I am happy with all that
technology has given . . . . I love when the bank knows all
about my accounts and alerts me to fraud. I love the fact that
103 See generally Natalie Ram, Genetic Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. 1357
(2019) (analyzing privacy considerations surrounding recent advancements in
genetics).
104 CHICKEN LITTLE (Walt Disney Co. 1943).
105 See Auxier et al., supra note 49. When asked if they had recently experienced three
of the most common privacy harms, respondents from the Pew Study overwhelmingly
answered in the negative.
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the doctor knows all about me. To be frightened is wrong . . . .
Every change is for the good even if it has good and bad things
. . . . What are you going to do, stay in your house the whole
time?106
I am not very concerned with these privacy concerns . . . by
collecting more data, you get more knowledge . . . through
machine learning, etc. It helps scientific progress. Every
generation is faced with this [fear]. New information can be
valuable . . . . We will get more benefits from AI, machine
learning.107
Another Futurist claimed, “I have nothing to hide, so what is the
problem? There are so many benefits . . . so make some concessions. I
don’t think we should let the negatives outweigh the positives.”108 On
the topic of Google, one Futurist said, “I don’t care enough to use those
services [alternative to Google]. Sometimes a targeted ad is nice if it is
what I am looking for.”109 Another Futurist commented, “Google is the
most phenomenal thing . . . . [It is] an amazing service that adds
tremendous value.”110
C. The Pragmatists: The Future of Privacy is . . . Different!
The center of the Resignation Curve is occupied by a small
subsection of individuals who expressed neither extremely positive nor
extremely negative views toward society given the current state of
privacy as they perceived it. Pragmatists, like almost all focus group
respondents, also perceived societal values to be trending away from
privacy.
Despite perceiving this trend, however, Pragmatists
themselves often still reported that they believed privacy ought to be
valued and protected because of the benefits it provided—primarily
those surrounding safeguarding against potential cyber-attacks that
threaten an individual’s financial or emotional well-being (a threat
Pragmatists often took seriously). Depending on which side of the
Resignation Curve members of this group fell on, Pragmatists were
either cautiously optimistic or cautiously pessimistic about the
direction in which society’s privacy values were trending—an attitude
106

Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author).
Focus Group 2 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Sept. 15, 2019) (on file with
author).
108 Focus Group 6 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with
author).
109 Focus Group 5 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 23, 2019) (on file with
author).
110 Focus Group 4 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 20, 2019) (on file with author).
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that was largely tied to a Pragmatist’s belief in the extent to which other
individuals also realized their individual agency over protecting their
personal privacy.
The following diagram illustrates how the cross section of certain
attitudes affects where an individual is placed along the Resignation
Curve. This depiction also distinguishes between Negative Pragmatists
(those on the left side of the curve) and Positive Pragmatists (those on
the right side of the curve). As previously stated, there was a subtle
difference in the attitude Pragmatists took toward their general feelings
about society given the current state of privacy as they perceived it. The
defining characteristic within this group was an individual’s perception
as to whether or not others also believed that they had individual agency
to affect their personal privacy. Many Pragmatists were optimistic as to
the agency of their peers, while others believed that they were alone in
their ability or willingness to either resist privacy tradeoffs or take
certain measures, as explored below, to mitigate the collection of their
data.
Resignation Curve Typologies

Unlike their peers at either end of the Resignation Curve,
Pragmatists cited a variety of ways—to various extents of personal
usage—that individuals could actually use technology to their benefit in
protecting personal privacy. This included practices such as private
browsing (a means of hiding users’ cookies, the mechanism through
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which websites track user traffic), VPNs (which allow individuals to
create secure networks to access the internet), and encryption (a tool
used to restrict information access). Knowledge of any one of these
technologies varied widely among even the Pragmatist group, and many
respondents—especially younger ones—reported that they were aware
of such methods to protect individual privacy, but did not actively utilize
these methods themselves, mostly due to a lack of technical knowledge.
Despite this fact, the mere existence of such technologies suggested to
the Pragmatists that perhaps a world devoid of privacy was not
inevitable, although many remained skeptical that enough people cared
enough, especially given tantalizing tradeoffs, or had the technical
knowledge to actually use such privacy-protecting technology (“PPT”).
For the Pragmatists, even among those who actively engaged with PPT,
the widespread use of PPT was a necessary step if the protection of
private information were to ever extend beyond small clusters of
privacy-concerned individuals.
The following are quotes from Pragmatists, near the apex of the
Resignation Curve: “I can choose: do I want to share [information], or do
I not want to share?”111 “I use DuckDuckGo instead of Google because
they respect my information.”112 Two Pragmatists highlighted the
moral duality of technology: “Every technology can be used for good and
evil . . . . Encryption is a secure way of storing information.”113 “The
future of privacy is different. Not bad or good necessarily—just
different.”114
VI. CONCLUSION: REFRAMING PRIVACY’S MEANING
The last question we asked focus group participants concerned the
future of privacy. We tasked each group to describe, in just a few short
words, what they expected from this future. While the responses varied,
the most cited phrase associated with privacy’s future was
“meaningless.” It is noteworthy that this word was used not just by
Defeatists who were dismayed by a future without privacy but by the
Futurists who championed the benefits of this new world as well.
Across the Resignation Curve, nearly every person cast doubt on the

111

Focus Group 1 (Seniors), Rutgers University (Sept. 13, 2019) (on file with author).
Focus Group 5 (Young Adults), Rutgers University (Sept. 23, 2019) (on file with
author).
113 Focus Group 6 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with
author).
114 Focus Group 6 (Middle Age), Rutgers University (Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with
author).
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meaning or purpose that privacy might play in an increasingly digital
society.
We have already discussed literary, philosophical, and legal
conceptions of privacy at length.115 Upon reflecting over the totality of
the data we gathered, however, it is worth emphasizing a phenomenon
also discussed by Solove in Nothing to Hide: the lack of a prevailing
consensus around any single conception of privacy or its alleged
values.116 This may seem strange given the final responses of our focus
group participants—how could individuals lament (or even celebrate)
the loss of privacy’s meaning, when that meaning was never entirely
clear in the first place?117
The notion that privacy conceptions are rather ephemeral and
amorphous in practice is supported by our focus group participants,
who often struggled to give coherent responses when asked what the
term “privacy” meant to them.118 It was not until these individuals were
further prompted that they could even attempt to outline any values
placed on privacy, and they did so primarily by identifying the types of
information they sought to keep private. Even the value of privacy
respondents assigned to these types of data was purpose-specific and
was not generally associated with higher ideals involving privacy itself.
For instance, for the most commonly cited categories—financial and
health data—respondents explicitly sought to keep this information
private because of fears over potential financial loss over the exposure
of that data.
Among the variety of responses on this topic, however, focus group
respondents constantly raised one theme, if not a clear definition. In
every focus group, the theme of control over one’s personal
information—or more commonly, the lack thereof—was cited in
discussions of respondents’ conceptions of privacy.119 Although these
discussions often also boiled down to a simple “feeling,” that feeling was
undoubtedly the sense of being in control over one’s personal
information; irrespective of whether or not a respondent was accepting
of his or her information being shared, he or she wished to have a say in
that decision. Upon reviewing these responses and their implications
within the larger context of privacy in the US and abroad, it became clear
115

See supra Part II.
See SOLOVE, supra note 42, at 24–26.
117 See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087
(2002) (discussing changing conceptions of privacy over time).
118 See infra APPENDIX A
119 See Auxier et al., supra note 49. Similar to our findings here, data from the Pew
Privacy Study showed that respondents’ conception of privacy is heavily skewed toward
the idea of control over their personal information. Id.
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that reconceptualizing privacy around a more nuanced notion of control
may be a worthwhile thought experiment to conclude our exploration
of privacy in the public eye.
A. Condition vs. Choice: The Privacy Paradox
Reconceptualizing privacy around the concept of personal choice
provides a new resolution to a paradox surrounding the left half of the
Resignation Curve.120 Defeatists lament their loss of privacy while
simultaneously sharing their information with Google, Facebook,
Amazon, etc.
Many Defeatists themselves attribute these
inconsistencies to an overwhelming feeling of resignation: with privacy
having “lost its meaning,” many respondents have succumbed to the
benefits of exchanging privacy for a variety of tradeoffs. Although
nearly all respondents agreed that these tradeoffs had immense value,
many—especially the Defeatists—felt as though they did not always
retain control over which tradeoffs to make and the extent to which
their own privacy should be exchanged for the corresponding benefits.
It is quite possible that when respondents lamented their loss of privacy,
they were actually lamenting their diminished control over the decision
to be private (or not), rather than the actual state of being private itself.
One could argue that individuals still retain complete control over
whether or not to share personal information. Our TOS agreement
discussion,121 however, serves as a counterargument to that belief. On
paper, it would seem that the free market grants individuals seemingly
limitless choices as to which data-collecting services to use, if any at all.
Indeed, many would likely point to the ability of privacy-concerned
individuals to abstain entirely from these services as justification for
their claim that people still retain some level of control over their
private information. Irrespective of the realistic feasibility of total
abstention, the perception our focus group respondents held was clear:
respondents felt as though they had no choice but to use certain
products—such as Google’s search engine—and to agree to its TOS
contract. Respondents articulated that abstention from interfacing with
any internet services would preclude them from participating in society
as the average person would. It is this feeling—the belief that one must
agree to TOS contracts or face societal ostracism—that is central to
privacy’s loss of meaning in the public eye.

120
121

See supra p. 1443.
See supra Part IV.B.
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As surfaced at the beginning of each of our focus groups,
respondents’ relationship to privacy was defined not by privacy itself
but by its competing interests. In the eyes of many respondents, the
compelling nature of these tradeoffs has essentially forced their hands
in a variety of situations, thereby eliminating any feeling of control over
their information. Although technology has provided a new impetus for
this exchange in the twenty-first century, individuals’ desire to trade
privacy for a competing interest is by no means a new phenomenon. In
None of Your Damn Business, Lawrence Capello provides evidence that
Americans were willing to exchange privacy for competing interests as
early as the Gilded Age.122 In his analysis, Capello argues that the current
state of privacy was not the inevitable result of technological progress,
outlining several key moments throughout American history in which
privacy was placed against a competing interest—and lost.123 This
analysis appears to reveal an unspoken truth: maybe individuals never
truly cared about the actual state of being private or anonymous.
While it may be difficult to gauge public sentiment in the past, it
may very well be possible that the loss of privacy’s meaning today can
be attributed to the romanticization of a privacy-devoted world that
never existed. In this world, everyone chose anonymity without the fear
of missing out. In actuality, there were simply fewer opportunities to
exchange privacy for competing interests in the past when compared to
the opportunities that exist today, due in large part to the advancement
of consumer technology. Previous conceptions of privacy, therefore, did
not have an impetus to distinguish the state of being private with the
decision to be private, for this was once a distinction without a
difference. Today, however, shifting emphasis to the latter distinction
could potentially provide a privacy framework that accounts for
individuals’ desire for agency over their personal information, while
also acknowledging their desire to occasionally share that information.
To speak in terms of our frog metaphor, who could blame people
for wanting warm water? For as a Futurist may claim, society has now
been ushered from a technological ice age into a paradise of information
enlightenment. Older conceptions of privacy, such as Westin’s, which
rely heavily on promoting the benefits of anonymity as a principle
component of privacy, may seem somewhat tone-deaf in a world where
over two billion individuals have Facebook accounts.124 These previous
122

CAPELLO, supra note 95, at 5–6.
Id. at 3–4.
124 J. Clement, Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 4th Quarter
2019, STATISTA (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/numberof-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide.
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conceptions, which focus more on the condition of being private rather
than the choice to enjoy that condition, are perhaps incompatible in a
world defined not by what is withheld but by what is shared.125 From
this perspective, it is unsurprising that respondents were unable to
describe what exactly privacy meant to them, largely because
traditional conceptions of privacy, which emphasize anonymity, are not
easily compatible with individuals’ willingness and desire, in some
instances, to share their information.
This inability to reconcile contemporary norms with amorphous
conceptions of privacy based on anonymity may be one reason
individuals feel a lack of control. Because traditional definitions of
privacy emphasize the actual state of being private rather than the
decision to retain that state (to whichever extent one chooses),
individuals may tend to conceptualize sharing-abstinence as a more
legitimate form of privacy instead of seeking out responsible ways to
share information.126 This feeling of not having control is likely
furthered by the need to seek out these responsible means rather than
having them implemented as a legislative standard.127
B. What’s the Point? The Purpose of Privacy
Advocates who champion privacy as an important part of human
dignity may criticize a conception of privacy that de-emphasizes the
actual condition of being private. Political theorists such as Westin, for
instance, have specifically cited the anonymity granted by privacy as a
contributing factor in securing a person’s dignity.128 But fears that a
model of privacy based around sharing, rather than withholding, would
undermine individuals’ ability to maintain their dignity are undoubtedly
unfounded for two reasons: the lack of association between privacy and
dignity, and the dignity that is still maintained through choice.129

125 But see Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906 (2013)
(providing an alternative analysis that argues in favor of older conceptions of privacy).
126 For example, limiting which smartphone applications have access to certain kinds
of data (i.e., location, Bluetooth, etc.), or restricting the ability of software to access data
altogether.
127 For example, the European Union and California have implemented measures that
may assist in granting users greater control over their data. These measures are further
explored in a later section. See infra Section VI.B.
128 WESTIN, supra note 11.
129 See Auxier et al., supra note 49. A majority of participants within the Pew Privacy
Study responded that the developments of new tools allowing for individuals greater
control over their personal information would be a more effective way to protect their
personal information. Id.
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Throughout the focus groups, the purpose of privacy was discussed
at great length. Many, but not all, respondents cited the benefits that
privacy offered in terms of protecting against potential harms,130 such
as identity theft or other forms of financial loss. Hardly any respondents
reported that they believed privacy was an end in and of itself. No
respondents offered “human dignity” as a potential value of privacy that
could compete against other interests such as convenience or
security.131 The closest the discussion came to this topic were the
instances in which individuals expressed concerns of government
eavesdropping, but even then, these concerns were also met with “I have
nothing to hide” claims from many other respondents. Almost all
respondents acknowledged, and even accepted, that today’s society is
defined more by a cost/benefit calculation than it is insisting on the
primacy value of human dignity.
This is not to claim that rhetoric surrounding human dignity has no
place in a new conception of privacy. Instead, the lack of salience of the
human dignity justification for privacy provides evidence as to why
privacy has been so heavily eroded in the United States. One reason
privacy may have lost the battles outlined by Capello132 could be that the
human dignity element of remaining anonymous was never that
compelling to Americans, and given the advent of new technology and
limitless information sharing, perhaps the human dignity argument is
now less compelling than ever. This is especially true given the ties
between traditional conceptions of privacy, human dignity, and
anonymity, or “the right to be let alone.”133 To the extent that humanity
wishes to share more information than ever before, it is perhaps
unsurprising that these arguments have not supported privacy
throughout the history of the United States.
Instead of associating human dignity with anonymity under older
conceptions of privacy, dignity ought to instead be tied to choice. It is
the ability to decide whether or not to be private, and the extent thereof,
that provides individuals with a sense of self-respect and worth, rather
130 An interesting point of contention from the focus groups was the extent to which
these harms were actually realized. While many focus group respondents used services
that, at one point, have been electronically compromised in some way, only a few
respondents cited cases in which they felt personally victimized by some violation of
their privacy due to a company being hacked or otherwise storing data in an unsecure
fashion. The extent to which these harms are unrealized may contribute to claims that
privacy concerns are often taken out of proportion.
131 See generally James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1164–70 (2004) (comparing the United States’
emphasis on liberty to European emphasis on dignity for issues involving privacy).
132 CAPELLO, supra note 95, at 6.
133 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 139.
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than the actual decision itself. For instance, a person who elects to enjoy
all of the competing interests of privacy at the cost of sharing their
personal information retains no more or less dignity than a person who
chooses to share nothing—so long as both individuals had the choice of
deciding.
Of course, creating and maintaining this choice is much easier said
than done. It may be tempting to identify the Pragmatist group of the
Resignation Curve134 as the set of individuals who best exemplify this
new conception of privacy. After all, these were the respondents who
had already begun to take measures135 with the hope of having better
control over access to their private information. Despite this
observation, we would caution against turning Pragmatists into
normative role models for other individuals in society if a robust
conception of privacy is to be preserved. The true takeaway from the
Pragmatist section is the type of behavior that flourishes due, in large
part, to the absence of other privacy protections. Perhaps these
individuals would be less inclined to engage with technologies that
grant them greater control over their privacy if they believed that this
control could be easily exerted through other means, such as legislative
provisions that compel companies to implement such controls into their
services.
Certain jurisdictions have actually sought to implement legislation
designed to grant their constituents greater control over their personal
data. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which
took effect in the European Union (EU) in May 2018, aims to protect all
residents of the EU, meaning anyone living in the region falls under the
same protective umbrella as citizens.136 To achieve this goal, all
companies with an internet presence in the EU must comply with its
regulations, including American businesses that have European
websites.137 A second fundamental change resulting from this
134

See supra p. 1443.
See supra p. 1448.
136 Juliana De Groot, What Is the General Data Protection Regulation? Understanding
& Complying with GDPR Requirements in 2019, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-gdpr-general-data-protection-regulationunderstanding-and-complying-gdpr-data-protection.
137 While companies may have implemented certain measures worldwide, GDPR
provisions only protect EU residents. Aarti Shahani, 3 Things You Should Know About
Europe’s Sweeping New Data Privacy Law, NPR (May 24, 2018), https://www.npr.org/
sections/alltechconsidered/2018/05/24/613983268/a-cheat-sheet-on-europe-ssweeping-privacy-law (stating that U.S. citizens are not necessarily entitled to the same
protections afforded to EU residents: “[i]n Europe, Facebook has to get permission to do
facial recognition—and it’s not the default setting. But in the U.S., it is. American users
have to click through screens to opt out”).
135
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legislation is an alteration in the definition of “personal data,” and,
accordingly, what data are included in these protections.138 Some
examples of categories of data not previously included are what you
post, electronic medical records, mailing addresses, IP addresses, and
GPS locations—all of which are now included as protected data.139
These foundational alterations are crucial in understanding the
legislation’s greater implications, as they alter previously caste-in-stone
beliefs about what “should” or “should not” be considered private.140
The GDPR contains several provisions designed to grant internet
users greater control over their privacy. For instance, to comply with
the GDPR, all companies must conform to an opt-in style of data
collection for any online services that track users’ information, with the
goal of encouraging increased awareness of and transparency regarding
the information being collected on the part of users themselves.141
Furthermore, the GDPR empowers EU users to request that companies
delete personal data they collect “without undue delay” or face potential
penalties under the law.142 Other critical components of this legislation
include: “[r]equiring the consent of individuals for data processing[;]
[a]nonymizing collected data to protect privacy[;] [p]roviding data
breach notifications[;] [s]afely handling the transfer of data across
borders[;] [and] [r]equiring certain companies to appoint a data
protection officer to oversee GDPR compliance.”143 This provides
consumers an enormous amount of control over their data compared to
the “wild west” of the internet as it had previously existed in Europe,
and as it continues to exist throughout much of the United States, with
some notable exceptions.144

138

Id.
Id.
140 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 2010, 2033–39 (2013) (discussing the potential implications of these new privacy
classifications).
141 Shahani, supra note 137.
142 Id.
143 Juliana De Groot, What Is the General Data Protection Regulation? Understanding
& Complying with GDPR Requirements in 2019, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-gdpr-general-data-protection-regulationunderstanding-and-complying-gdpr-data-protection.
144 See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
771, 786–87 (2019) (comparing the GDPR with other legislative approaches taken
around the world, primarily in Japan and the United States).
139
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California presents what is likely the most notable of these
exceptions. As of January 1, 2020, California’s Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) provides California residents145 with access to enhanced
knowledge and control over their personal data. Inspired by the
GDPR,146 the CCPA provides California residents with rights to the
following: (1) to know what personal data is being collected about them,
and by whom; (2) to know whether their personal data is being sold or
otherwise disclosed, and to whom; (3) to refuse to the sale of their
personal data; (4) to regain and curb access to their personal data; (5)
to request businesses to delete any personal data that they may have
collected; and (6) to not face discrimination for exercising their right to
privacy.147 The CCPA also provides California residents with legal
standing to bring suit against any qualifying company that violates these
provisions.148
Importantly, both the GDPR and CCPA comport with the
aforementioned new conception of privacy, as they do not seek to
restrict the quantity of information that companies can collect but
instead aim to give individuals greater awareness and control of their
personal information.149 Given the laws’ recency, it remains to be seen
what effect, if any, these pieces of legislation will have on the individuals’
behavior or general attitudes toward privacy. At the very least, the
GDPR and CCPA illustrate the potential influence that governments can
wield in safeguarding their citizens’ capacity to control private
information.150 This influence, however, can work both ways.
145

The provisions of the CCPA apply to all residents of California, and restrict any
business, nonprofit or for-profit entity that collects personal data of consumers,
conducts business practices in the state of California, and is characterized by at least one
of three “thresholds.”. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140 (2018). These thresholds include having
a gross annual revenue of $25 million or more, having the ability to buy or sell the
information of 50,000 or more individuals or separate households, and/or earning 51%
or more of its gross annual revenue from data selling. Id.
146 Although they share many similarities, there are several differences between the
two pieces of legislation. The most notable is that the CPPA protects data that originated
from the consumer directly, while the GDPR extends protections to cover data
purchased by third parties as well. Nicholas Moline, 2019 Changed the Internet Forever,
JUSTIA (Jan. 3, 2020), https://onward.justia.com/2020/01/03/2019-changedeverything.
147 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2018).
148 For further discussion of the origins of CCPA and GDPR, see Anupam Chander et
al., Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
149 Nicholas Moline, 2019 Changed the Internet Forever, JUSTIA (Jan. 3, 2020),
https://onward.justia.com/2020/01/03/2019-changed-everything.
150 Contra Woodrow Harztog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and
the Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1696–97 (2020) (providing an
alternative analysis of GDPR, especially its potential shortcomings if similar legislation
is applied in the United States).
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The most glaring case of government influence working against
privacy deserves special mention—China. Today, technology is being
deployed in the Chinese mainland to increase control over the
population under the guise of keeping civil order and promoting moral
norms, with the most common systems being facial recognition coupled
with large-scale data collection.151 Approximately 300 million facial
recognition cameras are being installed in train stations, at crosswalks,
on light fixtures, traffic signals, and buildings.152 Furthermore, pilot
testing for a social credit system is already taking place, in which the
government assigns credit scores to citizens based on their personal
habits and the scores of their associates. The Chinese government uses
those factors to indicate the presence of traits the Chinese Communist
Party finds desirable in its citizens.153 Currently, these pilots are facing
technical barriers due to the sheer amount of data that must be
processed,154 but this is a limitation that may not exist one
day—possibly soon.
The aforementioned developments do not stop at China’s borders.
Already, Chinese firms are working with foreign governments to spread
facial recognition technology.
Eighteen countries155—including
Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Kenya, the United Arab Emirates, and
Germany—are using Chinese-made monitoring systems.156 Chinese
technology is expanding past Chinese borders,157 so Americans face the
question of whether such a system could exist here, and what it may look
like. This may boil down to cultural questions and tolerance for privacy
invasions on a national level, but these are questions that people must
ask while they still can.
An old adage states, “knowledge is power.” We now live in an
information age with nearly limitless information available—but not
information all possesses equal value. Whether the end goals of
companies or governments are commercial gain or societal power, the
151

China Invents the Digital Totalitarian State, ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2016).
Id.
153 Mareike Ohlberg, Shazeda Ahmed, & Bertram Lang, Central Planning, Local
Experiments: The Complex Implementation of China’s Social Credit System, MERCATOR
INSTITUTE FOR CHINA STUDIES (Dec. 12, 2017).
154 Id.
155 Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel & Melissa Chan, Made in China, Exported to the World:
The Surveillance State, N.Y. TIMES (April 24, 2019). Thirty-six countries have received
training in topics such as “public opinion guidance . . . which is typically a euphemism
for censorship.” Id.
156 Id.
157 Amy Hawkins, Beijing’s Big Brother Tech Needs African Faces, FOREIGN POL’Y (July
24, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/24/beijings-big-brother-tech-needsafrican-faces.
152
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collection of personal data has proven to be among the most valuable
information that exists today in achieving these ends. Understanding
the value of this information and deciding for oneself what to do with
it—whether to enjoy a state of privacy or the seemingly endless benefits
of exchanging information (or to exist somewhere in between)—is
among the greatest challenges for humanity in the age of information.
To refer once again to our Frogs analogy, the amphibians perhaps
need not make the water cooler again—for that would be difficult to
convince others to do, and even those that might have once preferred
colder water now enjoy the warmth. Rather, the solution is to ensure
that they themselves have their hands on the faucet, ever vigilant of
reaching the boiling point.
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APPENDIX A: GENERAL SCRIPT/QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUPS
Hello all, and thank you for participating in our study! We have
been exploring the idea of a “right to privacy” amongst ourselves, and
we are excited to hear opinions on this topic from people outside of our
team. Our goal is to be able to initiate a conversation, through which we
will be able to hear each of your viewpoints about privacy and related
issues. We hope that you find this conversation as intriguing as we do,
and please feel free to interject with opinions, thoughts or questions at
any time.
• Like (previous person) just mentioned, we’d like to start by
asking very broad questions. For starters, the word
privacy has many different meanings to many different
people. We hear the word “privacy,” but specifically what
does privacy mean to you?
• Additionally, which information do you consider private?
• So let’s say right now I want to know the male to female ratio
at Rutgers. How would you find out this answer for me?
• So we’ve all used Google before, and you just did this search.
Something interesting that we found was that you
automatically agree to Google’s terms and services
agreement. Were you aware of that?
• How do you feel about it? Some people tend to feel
uncomfortable; some people think it’s fine. How do you
feel? Why?
• There’s some people who want these terms and conditions
to be up front, ask permission type; some are fine with the
way Google’s terms are. How do you feel about this?
• How often would you say you read the terms and services
agreements? Why?
• How do you feel about terms and services agreements?
• Do the terms and services agreements ever change whether
or not you use that service? Like, would you stop using
Google and use, say, DuckDuckGo because the TOS
changed?
• What are your impressions of these documents? How would
you describe them?
• Companies tend to reserve the right to change their TOS
whenever they like, so they’ll change it midyear and then
notify you that “we have updated our Terms and Services
agreement.” How do you feel when this happens?
• There are sites where when you click on them, they have a
popup saying “by using our website you agree to our
terms and services.” Do you prefer this kind of consent, or
do you prefer manually clicking yes?
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• What do you feel about websites that have the popup? Do
you like it when that happens? Or would you rather they
not bother?
• Do you have social media? So let’s take social media and
location services. A lot of social media will ask permission
to collect location data and see where you’ve been. And it
enables a few things, like your Lyft being able to find you
or your friends being able to know where you took that
photo. Do you have that enabled?
• How do you feel about companies having that information?
• What are all the ways you think companies use data? What
are all the ways you think they get this data?
• Would you rather pay for services like Google or Facebook,
or is the current system better in your opinion?
• Where do you think permission will go in the future? Do you
think companies are going to be more or less likely to ask
permission?
• Do you think you’ll be giving up more or less information in
the future?
• What is consent, and how/when should it be given?
o Must it be explicit?
o Can it be coerced?
• Next, we’d like to talk about a more specific form of consent,
the type of consent that certainly occurs between
companies and individuals, but also a type of consent that
may commonly occur between private individuals
themselves. The type of consent we would now like to
discuss involves individuals being recorded.
• For individuals recording other individuals, there are mainly
two schools of thought:
• Eleven states, including California, have adopted two-party
consent laws for recording conversations. Two-party
consent laws require both parties to agree to the
recording of a conversation. How do you feel about this?
• New Jersey is one of the other thirty-eight states which
requires only one party to have knowledge of a recording.
Do you tend to favor this?
• If you believe in one-party consent, what are some reasons
why you might see the benefits of two-party laws?
• If you believe in two-party consent, what are some
situations in which one-party consent may prove
beneficial?
• Even amongst our group, there is disagreement about
consent in extreme cases, such as a battered woman
recording her abusive husband. Do you see a conflict
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between the values of, for example, safety and that of
privacy?
• Should all recorded conversations be admissible as evidence
in court? How about in order to obtain a warrant for
arrest? What about to prove wrongdoing at the workplace
or in an academic environment?
• Suppose the police suspect that you are plotting to commit a
heinous crime. They are seeking information from your
phone that may connect you to this crime. They want
access to such data as your messages, your email, your
photos, and your location data. We are curious about the
level of difficulty that law enforcement will encounter in
obtaining your data. My first two questions concern your
belief about the way the world currently works in this
area. The questions I will ask after concern how you
believe the world should work, according to your opinion.
• Which data from your phone do you believe will be easiest
for the police to obtain?
• Which data from your phone do you believe will be the most
difficult for the police to obtain?
• Which data from your phone should be the easiest for police
to obtain? Why?
• Which data from your phone should be the hardest for
police to obtain? Why?
• Good afternoon! I’ve been looking into different aspects of
privacy, and how the expectations of which may vary
depending on the type of information and the different
companies or organizations that may be collecting it. To
do this, I’m going to ask you all a series of simple A or B
questions, for which I ask that you choose one of the two
options. We will do this anonymously, and I ask that you
all close your eyes and raise your hands (yes, we’re going
back to elementary school voting here). I will present the
two options to you, and then ask you to raise your hands
for each option. Ready?
o Who do you trust more (more comfortable
with knowing):
▪ NSA or Facebook
▪ Post office or Amazon
▪ FBI or Google
▪ FCC or Verizon
▪ Treasury or credit card companies
o Would you rather have the govt or a private
company knowing:
▪ your credit card info
▪ your location at all times
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▪ your call history
▪ who you associate with
▪ what you purchase
▪ where you’ve been sleeping
▪ your political leanings
• Quick recap/explanation of votes above
• General recap of conversation/entire group: What do you
think privacy will look like in the future?
o Why do you think so?
o Can you describe this in one word?
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APPENDIX B: RESPONDENTS’ ONE-WORD DESCRIPTIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE
FUTURE
Focus Group I (Seniors)
• We will get used to drinking the poison.
• We will be more aware of it, but it isn’t going to get better.
• We are more aware of it. We’re more careful. Is it better?
Probably not, but we’re more aware now.
Focus Group 2 (Middle Age)
• Scary, unknown
• Unknown but we are catching bad guys
• Uncontrolled
• Uncontrolled and concerned
• Not sure if liberal democracy will balance against
authoritarian dystopia and terrible stuff
• More complex in the future; privacy means different things
• Positive about the future—we will work out the issues
• Going in a negative direction
Focus Group 3 (Young Adults)
• Will be no privacy
• Declining
• Fine
• Non-existent
• Non-existent
• Minimal
• Functional
• Regulated
Focus Group 4 (Seniors)
• Gone
• Gone
• Okay
• Unknown
• Vanishing
• Safeguards will be enlarged
• Fragile
• Precarious—”thank goodness we are of the age that it is not
going to be our problem”
Focus Group 5 (Young Adults)
• Some or none
• Definition of privacy will change twenty years from now.
There will be a different technological environment. We
are a transitional generation. There will be ramped up
technology.
• The term ‘privacy’ will lose its meaning. In twenty years we
will say, “what is privacy?” It will just get lost, be
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meaningless.
With more sophisticated technology,
privacy will be meaningless.
• Even though privacy is decreasing, most of the public knows
this, and therefore may become more protective [with
respect to government and private corporations and
privacy]. The fact that people realize they are being
watched/located may lead to more policies.
• Meaningless
• Meaningless but will still want privacy
• Less privacy
• Declining
• Diminishing
• Unknown
Focus Group 6 (Middle Age)
• Scary—going down slippery slope where all know about me
• Very different
• Unimaginable
• Precarious
• Interesting
• Real—more and more we’ll accept the changes as they’re
inevitable.

